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In the existing literature, Chinese foreign policy is typically 
explained in terms of the pursuit of the “national interest.” Such 
“realist” explanations assume that these interests are the obvious and 
unambiguous correlates of China’s location in the regional and global 
political order, and that Chinese policymakers both understand these 
interests and pursue them in a rational and instrumental fashion. 
The problem with such an approach, however, is that the concept of 
national interest is simply too vague and subjective to provide a useful 
guide for understanding China’s actual conduct on the world stage. 
Chinese policymakers, like their counterparts in other countries, do 
not have an unmediated understanding of the global political-eco-
nomic order; nor are China’s interests obvious, unambiguous, or sim-
ply derivative of China’s place in that order. Moreover, policymakers 
(in China and elsewhere) are not simply “rational actors” in the sense 
implied by political realism or sociological individualism—that is, pur-
posive actors seeking to advance their (self-evident) interests through 
the utility-maximizing selection of the most instrumental means for 
any given end. Rather, Chinese officials are constituted through, and 
embedded in, social and cultural systems that produce the discourses, 
narratives, and frames through which they first make sense of the 
world and then act in it. To the extent that this is true, realist analyses 
of Chinese foreign policy simply cannot tell us much about the histori-
cally contingent and culturally inflected content of the national interest 
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as articulated and pursued by state officials. In short, realist analyses 
typically end up providing little more than incredibly thin accounts 
of Chinese foreign policy, accounts that ultimately fail to explain the 
recurring patterns of actual Chinese practice on the world stage. What 
is needed now is a way of theorizing China’s national interests in ways 
that allow us to move from such thin forms of description to a more 
satisfying and useful “thick” conceptualization of those interests.
One way of doing this is to adopt the view that state action is, in 
fact, a form of social practice in which the national interest is first con-
structed as a category of practical consciousness and then put into 
effect by state officials—rather than reflecting the instrumental pursuit 
of objective interests by a rational actor. In this view, while the national 
interest is clearly an important explanatory variable in accounts of state 
action, it is neither objective nor self-evident. Rather, it is the product 
of an inherently social interpretive process that produces specific and 
meaningful understandings of what constitutes both the national inter-
est and threats to the national interest. To the extent that this is true, 
understanding state action requires an understanding of the processes 
of representation and interpretation through which the national inter-
est is constructed and produced. In this essay, I argue that such an 
understanding requires a recognition that this representational pro-
cess is inherently storied and that the constitutive representations that 
govern social life are profoundly narrative in form. More specifically, 
I argue that the meanings that structure social action are produced 
through the pervasive and inescapable practice of knowing the world 
and one’s place in it through the construction of ontological narratives.1 
These are the stories that actors construct out of available cultural and 
linguistic resources to create meaning out of the confusion, complex-
ity, and disorder of lived experience. Simply stated, ontological narra-
tives are constitutive stories; that is, they actually produce (rather than 
simply attempt to reflect) social facts. They do this by generating the 
specific forms of knowledge, consciousness, “common sense,” theory, 
practice, and identity that allow people to understand—and thus act 
in—the world. At the level of global politics, such narratives take the 
form of geopolitical discourses, which can be thought of as meaning-
generating stories regarding the social field called “international rela-
tions.” As Gearóid ô Tuathail puts it, such discourses can usefully be 
conceptualized as forms of “discursive practice by which intellectuals 
of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to repre-
sent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and 
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dramas.”2 Like all ontological narratives, they are constitutive; that is, 
at the level of practice and consciousness, they organize the world into 
a meaningful place by populating it with actors, invest those actors 
with identities and (derivative) interests, and script the defining dra-
mas of global political life. Thus, rather than simply providing a more 
or less accurate reflection or map of the “objective” realities of a par-
ticular world order, geopolitical discourses are in fact profoundly pro-
ductive of that order.
Ideally, a study of Chinese geopolitical discourse would paint a 
detailed picture of the people, places, and defining dramas of world 
politics as narratively defined at both the elite and popular levels. 
Such a project, however, would be far beyond the scope of this short 
article. Instead, my rather more modest objective is to map the “root 
narrative” of Chinese geopolitical discourse. Its main argument is that 
there are ancient cultural and discursive currents that to this day exer-
cise a powerful influence on Chinese geopolitical thinking and foreign 
policy practice. For lack of a better label, this current of thought can 
be labeled the “Confucian-Mencian” cultural narrative.3 The follow-
ing section traces the outlines of this discursive tradition, highlighting 
both its imperial roots and its principal contemporary manifestations. 
The essay concludes with some thoughts on the limits of a cultural 
approach to understanding Chinese foreign policy.
II. The “Root Narrative” of Chinese Geopolitical Discourse
Historically, the Confucian-Mencian narrative depicted a Chinese 
world-system that was harmonious, hierarchical, and orderly. In this 
geopolitical imaginary, China was represented as the cultural center 
of the universe, entitled to the respect and deference of other polities 
and peoples with whom it was in contact: “In the traditional Chinese 
conception, a country’s cultural greatness determined its power in the 
world, so that a state with superior cultural achievements was entitled 
to esteem and influence among other states.”4 Simply put, the Confu-
cian-Mencian narrative created a hierarchical, Sino-centric world in 
which China enjoyed a “mandate of heaven” to dominate, exploit, and 
even assimilate those peoples whom the Chinese believed to be cultur-
ally backward.
Relations within and between China and its neighbors were depicted 
in the Confucian-Mencian narrative as essentially harmonious and 
orderly.5 This is not to suggest that this narrative was blind to the 
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possibility of conflict and strife in world affairs. Rather it is to argue 
that it viewed conflict as unnatural and aberrant, a condition that was 
brought about only by moral failure or inept leadership. According 
to the Confucian-Mencian narrative, this essentially harmonious state 
of affairs could best be maintained through virtuous behavior, moral 
persuasion, and cultural example. The mandate of heaven could best 
be preserved if Chinese rulers conducted themselves with propriety 
and in a manner consistent with li (Confucian rules of social conduct). 
In the Confucian universe, such conduct not only legitimized politi-
cal rule, it also enhanced the appeal of (subordinate) association with 
the Middle Kingdom. Similarly, appeals to peoples who had in some 
measure begun to internalize Confucian moral norms were seen as an 
effective means of preserving/restoring hierarchy and harmony. Thus, 
the moralizing that came to characterize China’s external relations was 
“not so much an act of arrogance as [a reflection of] the natural order 
of things given the Middle Kingdom’s opulence” and its narratively 
derived understanding of power.6
Perhaps not surprisingly, force played only a minor role in the Con-
fucian-Mencian geopolitical discourse. Since harmony could be pre-
served or restored through moral suasion and example, armed force 
was viewed as a relatively minor instrument of statecraft. Indeed, the 
resort to warfare was viewed as an admission of moral failure and 
poor leadership. Should warfare become unavoidable, the narratively 
prescribed strategy was one of “maneuver” (famou) rather than battle 
(fabing), of defense rather than offense.7
It has been argued that the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the onset 
of the “hundred years of humiliation” triggered the terminal demise of 
the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical narrative, paving the way for the 
triumph of the essentially Western Realpolitik narrative that has subse-
quently structured Chinese geopolitical thought and practice. In this 
view, the relatively sudden transition from unchallenged hegemon to 
weak semi-colonial state, coupled with subsequent efforts to restore 
China’s power and wealth, simply exposed the internal contradictions 
and delusions of the Confucian-Mencian narrative. Some also argue 
that the internalization of this essentially Western global cultural script 
was powerfully reinforced by the operation of an indigenous discourse 
(first promulgated by Xunzi) that—like Western Realism—emphasized 
the corruption of humanity, the conflictual nature of all human affairs, 




Careful analysis of contemporary Chinese foreign policy discourse 
and practice, however, suggests that this argument may be overstated. 
To be sure, the discursive and material realities of contemporary world 
order have rendered key elements of the Confucian-Mencian narra-
tive anachronistic. For example, the historical narrative construction of 
China as occupying the cultural center of the world is simply not sus-
tainable in the face of the contemporary distribution of cultural power 
in the international system. One can also find plenty of evidence to 
support the claim that the global cultural script of Realpolitik has largely 
displaced the indigenous Confucian-Mencian cultural tradition as the 
frame through which Chinese foreign policy officials understand and 
thus act in the world. Nevertheless, it seems that at least part of this 
narrative, what I call the “root narrative” of Chinese geopolitical dis-
course, continues to persist, albeit in slightly mutated form.
What are the key elements of this root narrative? At the risk of 
oversimplification, they can be summarized in the following terms. 
First, the narrative depicts China as a uniquely pacific, defensive, and 
non-expansionist power.9 While almost all peoples would narratively 
construct their national identity in this way, the Chinese go further 
than most in that they view their civilization as being uniquely pacific. 
Similarly, the root narrative emphasizes the defensive and non-expan-
sionist nature of China’s identity. In this geopolitical imaginary, China 
has never desired an inch of foreign soil. It has never attempted to 
conquer or colonize the peoples whom it encountered. In this respect, 
Chinese history is often explicitly contrasted with Western, and the 
travels of the Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng Ho are often rhetorically 
mobilized to “prove” the point. Similarly, China is represented as a 
defensive nation. In this case, the Great Wall is the discursive touch-
stone, cited widely as the ultimate manifestation and symbol of the 
defensive nature of Chinese civilization. One Chinese official pithily 
sums up this pacific self-representation in the following terms:
The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy…springs from 
the country’s historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 
5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chi-
nese thinkers advocated ‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and 
befriending good neighbors,’ which shows that throughout history the 
Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of 
friendship with the people of other countries.10
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Second, the root narrative of Chinese geopolitical discourse contin-
ues to construct and represent China as a “Great Power,” with a world-
historical role to play on the global stage. Historically, of course, the 
Confucian-Mencian narrative constructed China as a benevolent world 
power exercising hegemony over the pre-modern East Asian world-
system. In this discourse, China was the regional power, superior mate-
rially and culturally to most, if not all, of its neighbors. Contemporary 
Chinese geopolitical discourse differs from this historical narrative in 
that it does not depict China as a current, or even future, hegemon. 
Rather, it portrays China as a nation in the process of recovering the 
Great Power status it lost as a result of a century of victimization and 
humiliation, when it was reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial vas-
sal state of Western and Japanese imperialists.11 On the surface, this 
appears to be a dramatic change. However, while the narrative recast-
ing of China as a non-hegemonic state is an important discursive shift, 
in fact it masks a deeper continuity in China’s dominant geopolitical 
discourse: a self-representation of China as a past and future Great 
Power destined to play a major role in world affairs. Put simply, while 
the dominant geopolitical discourse continues to depict China as a 
regional power with limited global significance, it also portrays China 
as a rising power entitled by virtue of its size, culture, and economic 
power to a place of pre-eminence in global politics. Significantly, mili-
tary might is not thought to be part of the equation; rather, power is 
conferred by wealth and moral example. Ultimately, this is not that dif-
ferent from the self-representation of China at the heart of the histori-
cal Confucian-Mencian imaginary.
Finally, the root narrative of the Chinese geopolitical imaginary con-
tinues to emphasize the importance of morality as a source of power. 
In the Imperial era, this took the form of a belief that morality (virtu-
ous behavior, moral persuasion, ethical example) was the single most 
important source of state power. In contemporary Chinese discourse 
and practice, morality is still viewed as a source of power and prestige. 
Thus, in ways that might well have been comprehensible to Chinese 
officials at any point during the last millennium, China’s foreign policy 
continues to be characterized by both a tendency to moralize on the 
international stage and a strong desire to be perceived as member in 
good standing of the international community. The tendency to moral-
ize was perhaps most evident in the foreign policy of Mao during the 
1950s–1970s, although it has by no means disappeared.12 The impulse 
to play the role of member-in-good-standing of the international com-
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munity has gained greater force since the 1980s, as evidenced by Chi-
na’s growing (and increasingly constructive) engagement in a range of 
multilateral fora (such as the U.N., WTO, and the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization). Viewed through a Realist lens, neither China’s mor-
alizing nor its constructive multilateralism is readily comprehensible. 
Viewed from a more cultural/constructivist perspective, however, the 
latter policy in particular makes considerably more sense. The conver-
gence of a narratively derived (and essentially Confucian-Mencian) 
understanding of the nature of power, on the one hand, with a narra-
tively derived (and essentially Confucian-Mencian) self-understanding 
of China as a Great Power, on the other, has produced a foreign policy 
“script” that inclines Chinese officials to pursue the current foreign 
policy of “generally status-quo-oriented constructive activism.”13
III. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this short study has been to illuminate some of the 
cultural and discursive roots of China’s dominant contemporary geo-
political imaginary. Its main argument is that Chinese foreign policy 
discourse today is powerfully conditioned by a root narrative that can 
trace its lineage to the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical discourse of the 
Imperial era. The way in which China’s foreign policy officials under-
stand China’s national interests and subsequently pursue those inter-
ests on the international stage are largely derived from this narrative.
By way of conclusion, I would like to register two qualifications to 
my argument. First, nothing I have argued should be interpreted as 
suggesting that Chinese foreign policy officials are merely “bearers of 
culture” who automatically enact the geopolitical scripts entailed in 
this root narrative in specific diplomatic settings. Clearly, this is not 
the case. To begin with, it is not always obvious which scripts are to 
be enacted in any given setting. Social actors are invariably embedded 
within multiple, contested, conflicting, competing, and even contra-
dictory discourses (e.g., the Confucian-Mencian and Parabellum para-
digms) that shift over time and thus preclude categorical stability of 
action. As a result, while those warranted to act on behalf of the imag-
ined community might enact one script in one set of circumstances 
(because it is required by their narratively derived sense of being at 
that particular time and in that particular setting), in another set of 
circumstances alternative narratives might be triggered that involve 
a different sense of identity/interest and that entail different scripts of 
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appropriate action. Additionally, state officials do not enact narratively 
derived scripts without reflection. Rather, they approach the social 
world reflexively, acting in terms of their interpretation of the relevant 
cultural rules rather than being governed directly by them. This means 
that social action cannot simply and unproblematically be read off a 
given script. Instead, understanding action requires a recognition that 
situated actors actively interpret both scripts and the circumstances 
within which they find themselves.
Second, nothing I have argued should be construed as denying the 
role of what some have called the Parabellum tradition in the definition 
of China’s national interest. As J. D. Yuan argues, within the broader 
Chinese cultural tradition, there are in fact two discourses related to 
world order and foreign policy. The first, discussed above, derives 
from the philosophy of the Confucian scholar Mencius, who saw the 
world as harmonious, hierarchical, and relatively peaceful. The other, 
derived from the philosophy of another Confucian scholar, Xunzi, por-
trays the world as disharmonious, dangerous, and inherently conflic-
tual. This latter discourse, typically referred to as the Parabellum or 
Realpolitik tradition, has clearly exercised a powerful influence over 
Chinese geopolitical discourse and foreign policy practice in both pre- 
and post-revolutionary China. To argue otherwise would be intellectu-
ally dishonest. But my argument does not depend on making such a 
move because the point I am trying to make is that the Confucian-Men-
cian geopolitical discourse does in fact continue to exercise a powerful 
influence over the thinking and conduct of the Chinese policy estab-
lishment, contrary to the arguments advanced by many Realist observ-
ers of Chinese international policy. Ultimately, then, I am not making 
an either-or argument. Rather, I am suggesting that a full account of 
the cultural and discursive framing of China’s national interest and for-
eign policy practice requires an understanding that the two narratives 
are not mutually exclusive, but dialectically fused within the Chinese 
geopolitical imaginary. While this imaginary is necessarily constantly 
evolving in response to historical transformations both within China 
and at the level of world order, it is the constant reinterpretation of 
these yin and yang discursive threads against the backdrop of concrete 
historical circumstances that gives China its distinctive geopolitical 
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